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1. Introduction
The subject matter fallacy is the fallacy of supposing that the content of a statement or
a belief consists in the conditions the truth of the statement or belief puts on its subject
matter: the objects the statement or belief is about. Consider my belief that Hillary Clinton
is a resident of New York. The subject matter of this belief are the things and conditions
(properties, relations) it is about: Hillary Clinton, the state of New York, and the relation of
being a resident of. For the belief to be true, these objects have to meet certain conditions;
the first two must bear the third to one another; that is, Hillary Clinton must be a resident of
New York. It is quite natural, then, to take the proposition that Hillary Clinton is a resident
of New York to be to be the content of the belief. But in fact it is only one of a number of
contents of the belief; it is the content given the facts about reference; it is what else the
world has to be like, once we take those facts as fixed. We need to appreciate that these
contents, the subject matter or referential contents, are only one of a range of contents
that are systematically related: the contents of a statement or belief given various facts. Of
particular importance in the case of recognition are what I call reflexive contents, in which
not all of the facts about the subject matter of a statement or belief are given. I call these
reflexive, because conditions are put on the statement or belief itself.
In this paper I argue that if we commit the subject matter fallacy, we cannot provide
suitable contents for statement of identity and beliefs about identity, including the very
common sort of belief that one acquires when one recognizes another person, place or
thing.
I provide a case of recognition for contemplation in Section 2, introduce reflexive con-
tents in Section 3. In Sections 4 and 5 I try to explain the importance of reflexive contents,
and their relation with subject matter contents. I discuss what I call “the subject matter
fallacy”, which misleads us in such cases, in Section 6.
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2. A case of recognitionSuppose that I have never met Fred Dretske, but I know who he is. As a matter of fact,
suppose that I know every fact there is to know about which books Dretske has authored.
Call these the Dretske/book facts, or the dretskical facts, for short. He has written, so far,
Seeing and Knowing, Knowledge and the Flow of Information, Explaining Behavior, and
Naturalizing the Mind. So I know, in particular:
(1)Dretske wrote Knowledge and the Flow of Information.
I admire this book very much, and have long wanted to meet and shake hands with its
author.
Then one day I am at a party and I am standing next to Dretske, and we chat for a
while. He says some interesting things about knowledge and information, and so I begin
explaining—not quite accurately, one might suppose—Dretske’s ideas on the subject, and
recommend that my interlocutor go out and read Knowledge and the Flow of Information.
“Well actually”, he says, “I wrote Knowledge and the Flow of Information”. At this point
I learn something, something I could express with,
(2)You wrote Knowledge and the Flow of Information
or, pointing to Dretske,
(3)That man wrote Knowledge and the Flow of Information.
How did the content of my beliefs change, when I acquired this knowledge?
In the beginning of the story, my beliefs about Dretske were detached from my current
perception of him. After Dretske told me who he was, they came attached. Here is what
I mean by this. At the beginning of the story, I had beliefs about Dretske. These beliefs
involve what I call a notion of Dretske, associated with various ideas I’ve got from reading
things by him and about him. The notion is sort of like internal file folder, and the ideas
like information that has been put in it. This inner file was set up when I first heard about
and read articles by Dretske. This notion is not, at the beginning of the story, attached to
any perception I am having. That is, I am not building up information based on any of the
things I am seeing.
When a notion is attached to a perception, the information one picks up perceptually
modifies the ideas associated with the notion. If things go right, of course, the perception
will be of the person or thing the notion is of. But the relation of attachment is independent
of the relation of co-reference. Things can go quite wrong. Suppose for example that I have
a perception of David Israel attached to my notion of Paul Newman. This is what happens
when I see Israel and mistakenly take him to be Newman. My perception and my notion do
not co-refer, but they are attached—by mistake. As a result I may tell people later, “Paul
Newman is in Palo Alto”.
At the beginning of the party, my mistake is the opposite of this one. My notion of
Fred Dretske, the one I am drawing on to describe his views, and my perception of my
interlocutor, do in fact co-refer, but they are not attached. I am perceiving a thin, average-
sized man with an intense, slightly puzzled, slightly amused, slightly annoyed expression.
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I don’t add these ideas to my Dretske notion. I don’t have the belief that Dretske is puzzled,
annoyed, amused, and talking to me.
Here is a picture of the way our beliefs are organized, that will help make this clear.
Think of the architecture of our beliefs as a three story building. At the top level are de-
tached files (ideas associated with notions), such as my beliefs about Dretske. At the bottom
level are perceptions and perceptual buffers. Buffers are new notions, associated with the
perceptions, and used to temporarily store ideas we gain from the perceptions until we can
identify the individual, or form a permanent detached notion for him, or forget about him.
The middle level is full of informational wiring. Sockets dangle down from above, and
plugs stick up from below. The ideas in the first floor perceptual buffers, and in the third
floor files, are constantly compared. When there is a high probability that they are of a
single person or thing, recognition (or misrecognition) occurs. The plug from the buffer is
plugged into the socket for the notion. Information then flows both ways.
The information flowing up from the perception adds new ideas to the file associated
with the notion. So, in the Israel–Newman case, the idea of being in Palo Alto is added to
my Newman file. The information flowing down to the bottom level enriches the perceptual
buffer, and motivates me to act towards the objects I see and hear in ways that would make
no sense given only the information picked up from perception. So perhaps I yell in the
direction of David Israel, “Hey, Paul Newman! Love your movies! Love your spaghetti
sauce! Love your popcorn!”.
To return to the Dretske case. What happens when Dretske says, “I wrote Knowledge
and the Flow of Information”? First my perceptual buffer is enriched by the idea that
this fellow, the one I am talking to, wrote the book (he doesn’t seem like the sort to fib
about such a thing to a stranger at a party). I’m quite sure there were no co-authors on the
book. Activity ensues on my mind’s second story: perceptual plug finds notional socket.
Information flows in both directions. This information is integrated with other things I
know, including the social rule that one doesn’t blabber on about a book to its author as
if one knew all about it. I am embarrassed and turn red. I say something like, “Oh, I’m
very pleased to meet you. I didn’t recognize you. As you can tell I admire your work. I’m
somewhat embarrassed”. I shake his hand.
Now these remarks of mine, and my embarrassment, and my endeavor to shake his
hand, seem to be explained by a new belief, a new bit of knowledge. It is what I shall call
recognitional knowledge, the sort of knowledge that occurs when one attaches percept and
notion. But what exactly is known in these cases?
3. Reflexive contents
Consider now three of my mental states before recognition. One is my belief that Fred
Dretske wrote Knowledge and the Flow of Information. On my simple model, this consists
of my concept (mental general term) of being the author of Knowledge and the Flow of
Information being belief-associated with my Fred Dretske notion (mental name, more or
less). The second is my desire to shake Fred Dretske’s hand. This consists of the concept
of my shaking hands with a person being desire-associated with my Dretske notion. The
third is my perception that the man in front of me is friendly and outgoing. This consists
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of my perception of Fred Dretske, attached to a perceptual buffer, which is associated with
the concepts of being friendly and outgoing (a mental statement).
If we look at the way we use the concept “what is believed” or “what a person be-
lieves”, we would find some good evidence for a referentialist treatment of beliefs about
individuals, just as has been found in the case of statements about individuals using names,
indexicals and demonstratives [1, Chapter 10]. A referentialist semantics takes the content
of a representation to be a “singular proposition”, that is, a proposition about an individual,
as opposed to being about some identifying condition that the individual satisfies. In this
case, the referential semantics gives the result that I want to shake Fred Dretske’s hand,
and believe that Fred Dretske is standing in front of me, friendly and outgoing. Given this
description of my mind, it is hard to understand why I don’t reach out and grab his hand
and give it a good shake: I want to shake x’s hand; I believe x is standing in front of me;
I believe x is friendly and outgoing.
The reason, in terms of our simple model, is that to activate that bodily movement that
is a way of shaking hands I need to desire to shake the hand of the person in front of me.
I would form that desire, as a way of fulfilling my long standing desire to shake Dretske’s
hand, if all my beliefs about Dretske were in the same file. But they are not. There are two
notions involved, my long-standing Dretske notion and my perceptual buffer. So I don’t
move.
Once I recognize Dretske, I do move my arm towards him, smile, and say, “I’d like to
shake your hand”—a well-known procedure for shaking the hand of the person in front of
one. And this action is rationally motivated by my new beliefs, in a way that it wouldn’t
have been by my old. That is, given the content of my beliefs, if my beliefs are true, this
action is a way of satisfying my desire. We need a richer concept of content to understand
what is going on.
Consider two beliefs, which I’ll call b1 and b3. b1 is the belief that I had before the
party, and would have expressed with (1). b3 is the belief I acquired when Dretske said,
“I wrote Knowledge and the Flow of Information”. (I won’t discuss the beliefs associated
with (2), so the reader needn’t worry about b2.) As above, I’ll assume that a belief about
an individual involves a notion of the individual and ideas of the relevant properties and
conditions.
The first belief, b1, is not connected to my perception of Dretske. This sort of belief
is (in more or less normal cases) about the origin of the notion—whoever or whatever it
was that was referred to in the information that established it. If things go right, the origin
will also be the source of a vast majority of ideas associated with the notion.1 In this case,
the name “Fred Dretske” on the cover of Seeing and Knowing, the first book I read of his,
referred to Dretske, and led to my forming my notion. So it is a notion of him. The belief
b1 is true if that person wrote Knowledge and the Flow of Information.
The second belief, b3, also involves a number of ideas associated in a file. But this file
is connected to a perception. Information gleaned from the perception is put directly into
the file. Information in the file is used to deal with the object being perceived. This sort of
belief is about the individual who is perceived.
1 See [2] for the concept of source and dominant source.
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As I said, our ordinary concept of “what is believed”, assigns contents in a way analo-
gous to those the standard semantics assigns to the statements (1) and (3). This referential
semantics for beliefs will say that what is believed is a proposition about the individual the
notion or buffer is of. My old notion, involved in belief b1, is of Dretske, and so what is
believed is that Dretske wrote Knowledge and the Flow of Information. My new perception
is also of Dretske, and so what I believe after the recognition occurs is just what I believed
before, that Dretske wrote Knowledge and the Flow of Information. This level of content
doesn’t give us what we need, to understand what changed.
4. Incremental content
There are many other levels available. Our ordinary concept of content has had its crit-
ics, but I am enthusiast. It is a key element of folk psychology, probably humankind’s
greatest intellectual accomplishment. We need not to jettison content, but to discover more
of it, which I propose to do with a formula I call the “Content Analyzer”:
CA: Given such and such, φ is true iff so and so.
Here φ is any truth-evaluable representation, such and such are facts about the repre-
sentation, and so and so is the content assigned to φ given those facts. So and so is what
else has to be the case for φ to be true, in addition to the such and such that is given. It is
the additional or incremental content of φ, given such and such. If we vary what is given,
we vary the content assigned. These will not be different theories about the content of φ.
They will be ways of getting at different systematically related contents of φ.
Consider Donnellan’s’ famous example,“Smith’s murder is insane”. Given that the
statement is in English, the facts about its syntax and the meanings of its words, what
else has to be the case for it to be true? There must be a unique individual that murdered
Smith, and that individual must be insane. This is the “attributive content”. Now suppose
we add to what is given the fact that Jones murdered Smith. Then what else must be the
case for the statement to be true? Jones must be insane. This is the “referential content”
in Donnellan’s terminology. I shall say that the facts about the designation of “Smith’s
murderer” were loaded in the latter case, and unloaded in the former.2
What is not loaded, remains relevant. Think of propositions as sets of worlds. In the
worlds that are members of the attributive content, various people will murder Smith, and
each of them will be insane in that world. The issue of murdering Smith remains connected
to the issue of being insane. On the other hand, What is loaded, ceases to be relevant. If
we take it as given that Jones murdered Smith, we have the referential content. Given that
Jones murdered Smith, what else has to be true for Smith’s murderer to be insane? Jones
has to be insane. In each world in the referential content Jones is insane, but he need not
murder Smith in all of them, and in fact nobody has to murder Smith, Smith does not even
2 Here I am employing Wettstein’s [8] interpretation of Donnellan’s distinction, and ignoring Donnellan’s
treatment of “near-miss” cases, an important aspect of his original discussion.
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need to exist. The facts about Smith and his murderer are used to get us to Jones, and then
in effect thrown away. They are no more relevant to the truth of the referential proposition
than that the utterance was in English, or that it occurred at all.
In other words,
Only a small part of the truth conditions of an utterance are usually incorporated into
what we think of as its content. The other parts are taken as given, and exploited to get
us to the subject matter we are interested in.
Now consider my statement (3). On the standard semantics for indexicals and demonstra-
tives, I would be taken to express the singular proposition that Fred Dretske is the author
of Knowledge and the Flow of Information. This means we load the fact about who I am
demonstrating into what is given. As our content assigner puts it:
Given that (3) in English, etc., and given that the speaker is attending to and drawing
attention to Fred Dretske, (3) is true iff Fred Dretske is the author of Knowledge and the
Flow of Information.
The fact that we take this content to be “what is said”, however, does not mean that
other, less loaded, contents are not available. If we do not load the facts about reference,
we get:
Given that (3) is in English, etc., (3) is true iff the person the speaker of (3) is attending
to and drawing attention to is the author of Knowledge and the Flow of Information.
The unloaded contents of (2) and (1) are quite different from that of (3):3
Given that (2) is in English, etc., (2) is true iff the person the speaker is addressing
with (2) is the author of Knowledge and the Flow of Information.
Given that (1) in English, etc., (1) is true iff the person the speaker of (1) is using
“Dretske” to refer to is the author of Knowledge and the Flow of Information.
These differences are useful in understanding the different motivations one would have for
uttering (1), (2) or (3), and the different information one might pick up from hearing them.
These differences disappear at the level of referential content, which is typically not very
useful for explaining the cognitive significance of statements.4
In the case of (1), (2) and (3), our unloaded contents were reflexive, in the sense that the
contents had the utterance themselves as constituents.
Now let’s return to b1 and b3. If we do not take the reference as given, we can “retreat”
to reflexive truth conditions. The belief b1 involves a notion that is, in fact, of Dretske.
When we set that fact aside, its truth condition is simply that whoever that notion is of,
3 I do not claim that the analyses of demonstratives and names incorporated into these examples are particu-
larly sophisticated, only that they are plausible enough to make the point.
4 See [7], passim.
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wrote Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Belief b3 involves a perceptual buffer, that
in fact is of Dretske. If we set that fact aside, the truth condition is that whoever that
perceptual buffer is of, wrote Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Dretske is not a
constituent of either of these propositions. The one has a detached notion as a constituent,
the other a perceptual buffer. The ordinary referents of a statement are not constituents of
its reflexive content, but rather the words that refer to them; the objects a belief is about are
not constituents of its reflexive content, but rather the notions and buffers involved in it.
Just as the reflexive contents of our statements made clear how two statements with the
same referential content can have quite different cognitive significance, the reflexive con-
tents of our beliefs make clear how they can have different causal roles, each appropriate
to its own reflexive content.
Reflexive content is the level of content at which the belief’s capacity, or lack of capac-
ity, for motivating action is relevant. It is the level at which knowing-that meets knowing-
how. I know how to shake the hand of someone in front of me that I am perceiving. I stick
out my hand towards the person, while smiling, and perhaps saying, “I’d like to shake your
hand”, the fine movements being guided by the perceptions of my hand, the person, and
their relationship. What ultimately drives the operation is a desire that will be satisfied only
if I shake the hand of the person who my present perception is of. That is, the ultimately
motivating desire is attached to a perception of the person. This desire will typically be
a subsidiary desire, formed in virtue of a belief that has as its reflexive content, that the
attached perception is of someone concerning whom I have a higher level desire.
In the Dretske case, once recognition takes place, I form such a desire. When recognition
takes place, my perceptual buffer and my notion share ideas. This includes not only belief-
associated ideas, but desire-associated idea. So the desire to shake a person’s hand becomes
associated with my perceptual buffer of Dretske. The referential content of this new desire
is simply to shake hands with Dretske, the same as the referential content of the desire I
had had for years. There is no change in referential content to explain why I suddenly, after
all of these years, stick out my hand. This is explained by the change in reflexive content,
however.
5. The search for recognitional knowledge
Have we then found what we are looking for, the bit of knowledge that I gained, when I
identified Fred Dretske? Does this recognition amount to my believing something like the
following?
The author of Knowledge and the Flow of Information is the person whom
(4)the perception attached to b3 is of.
That is not the right way to look at it. One can see this in a couple of ways. In the first
place, it would be a very odd belief for me to have. Well, this isn’t quite right. After all we
are dealing here with a philosopher talking to a famous epistemologist. I might very well
be thinking about my beliefs and perceptions. I might be obsessing over them. Who knows
what philosophers might be thinking about at parties. But at least it would be a very odd
belief for most people to have.
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Secondly, notice that believing the proposition in question, would not guarantee that I
am in the mental state we are after. Suspend your belief that I am making up a story about
not recognizing Dretske. Assume I am telling you the literal truth. In that case I have told
you about a belief I once had, b3. You know quite a bit about it. And in particular you
know (4), that the person that the perception attached to it is of, is the author of Knowledge
and the Flow of Information. You’d perhaps use the past tense to express it, and say “the
perception that was attached to it was of”. If we worked hard, however, we could construct
an example in which you knew this at the same time I had the belief, and if we worked even
harder we could construct an example in which I believed (4), but this clearly was not part
of my recognition of Dretske. This last sort of example would no doubt involve mirrors.
But we shouldn’t need to go to all that work to see the point, which is that there is a
difference between:
– believing a proposition P ,
– having a belief a reflexive content of which is P .
In general, the propositions we believe, the ones referred to by the phrase “what he be-
lieves”, are not ones about our own perceptions and ideas, but ones about their subject
matter: the things, people, places and events that our perceptions and ideas are of. That is,
when we describe our beliefs and perceptions we standardly do so in terms of their loaded
contents. We do not say that I believe, of my Dretske notion, that is of someone who wrote
a certain book, but that I believe that Dretske wrote the book. But those very same beliefs
have other contents, that our Content Analyzer can get at by taking less as given. These are
not alternative things the agent believes, they are less loaded contents of his belief.
When we ascribe a belief to a person about a certain individual, and involving a certain
property or relation, we suppose that the agent has a notion of that individual, and an idea
of that property or relation. The agent keeps track of what is going on in the world in terms
of those notions and ideas. But typically the agent will not have notions and ideas of all
of the objects, properties and relations involved in the reflexive contents. A person could
have a belief with (4) as its reflexive content, who had never heard of perceptions, and had
no idea that he had any. But then we might ask, what relevance can this content have to
understanding our beliefs?
6. Information games
Although the non-philosopher of the last paragraph may not know about perceptions,
he will know the difference between things he has perceptions of, and things he does not.
Moreover, he will be able to adjust his action to the nature of his perceptions; he will be
attuned to the difference between having a perception of a man two feet away, and one of a
man three feet away, for example. In general, you do not need the concepts to be attuned to
factors in a situation, that the theorist needs to discuss those factors. Attunement and belief
are different faculties; different species of doxastic attitudes towards situations.
It may be helpful here to introduce the concept of an “information game” [6]. An in-
formation game involves two events, the pick up of information about something in the
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external world, and the use of that information to guide behavior towards that thing pursuit
of goals. I see a tennis ball coming towards me, and I adjust my arm and wrist so that my
racket hits it. This is an example, more or less, of a “straightthrough” information game;
I use the information I am picking up perceptually to guide simultaneous action. My action
needs to be attuned to the nature of my perceptions. Beliefs don’t have much to do with it.
Much of our lives is spent playing species of a quite different information game, how-
ever, which I call “detach and recognize”. We pick up information about something in the
external world at one time, by having perceptions of it. We store that information away for
later use. At some later time we recognize the object, and use the information gotten pre-
viously to guide our behavior towards it. This approach doesn’t work very well for playing
tennis. But it works well with relatively stable properties of people, things and places that
we encounter over and over in our lives.
I think the natural home for our concept of belief is to describe the information and
misinformation we store in this detached way.
Suppose for example at the same party where I make a fool of myself with Fred Dretske,
I also meet Krista Lawlor. Krista Lawlor is a young philosopher I had not previously heard
of. When I meet her, a notion is assigned to store information about her. At first this notion
is a perceptual buffer. I associate with it ideas of her interests, her name, her appearance and
so forth. But then the party ends. She goes one way, I go another. My notion is detached.
We can suppose that the perceptual buffer is promoted to the third-floor, or we can suppose
that it sends all of its information up to a third floor notion and then expires. At any rate, I
go home with a detached notion of Lawlor.
If the file associated with this detached notion has enough relevant information in it,
the next time I see Lawlor it will be helpful in two ways, in recognizing her, and in acting
appropriately. First, my memory of her appearance will help me to recognize her. My
memory of her name will enable me to greet her in an appropriate way, by saying “Hi
Krista” instead of “Hey you” or “mumble-mumble”. And my memory of her interests will
enable me to engage in a mutually interesting philosophical conversation about, say, how
we know when we have beliefs about the same thing, rather than merely saying “Nice
weather” or “Read any good books, lately?”.
When we play the detach and recognize information game, the person who picks up
the information, and the person who applies it, need not be the same, for the information
may have been communicated from one to the other. This information can be tremen-
dously useful. I am heading to Bonn, Germany. I have never been there. I buy a map, and a
guidebook. They each provide, in different forms, information that I can attach to my per-
ceptions of Bonn when I get there, and then use to find the Opera House, or the University,
or Beethoven’s birthplace.
7. The subject matter fallacy
Now I want to suggest that when we think of knowledge, it is these detached represen-
tations we think of—the representation that are capable of being passed from individual
to individual, stored in libraries, perhaps for centuries, and then, at least in many cases,
reattached to new perceptions of the relevant objects. And this leads to a central fallacy
102 J. Perry / Journal of Applied Logic 1 (2003) 93–105
of philosophy, the fallacy of trying to explain, in detached representations the content that
explains all of our knowledge.
It simply cannot be done. Useful knowledge, knowledge that guides our actions in pur-
suit of our goals, is attached. Detached knowledge is incomplete. The world of detached
knowledge is the world of knowledge-completers. The view from nowhere is not a view at
all. It is a mass of detached information, of no use until it is attached.
In the detach and recognize language game, attachments are used and then thrown
away. I remember what Lawlor looked like, but I don’t remember the perception I had.
My cognitive structure is set up to keep track of facts about people, places and things, not
perceptions. They come, they do their job, they leave.
And thus, when we characterize a person’s belief and knowledge, we are typically after
the detached knowledge. We ignore the shape of the connection between notion and thing.
Just as our mind is set up to glean and retain facts about people, places and things, our
language for describing the mind focusses on the retained facts and not the means by
which they were picked up, or will be used. This is the reason that referential content, the
conditions that the truth of the belief places on the subject matter, given the way the mind
is connected to it, has such a robust life in folk psychology, as what is said and what is
believed.
But referential content is not the only content recognized in the practices of folk psy-
chology. The folk who use folk psychology are perfectly able to understand why I don’t
shake hands with Dretske until I recognize who he is, until I realize that he is Dretske. The
semantics of terms such as “recognize” and “realize” is not referential.
Our purpose here is not to do the semantics of recognitional terms, but to make the point
that to understand the phenomenon of recognition one needs an enriched concept of belief
content. One should think of a belief as having a hierarchy of contents, as more and more is
taken as given, and detached from the truth conditions, culminating in the referential con-
tent. The other contents, the attributive and reflexive contents, are not different beliefs, but
different aspects of the same belief, aspects that are necessary to understand the differences
between beliefs with the same referential content.
I use the term “fallacy” because I think the mistake of thinking that the subject matter
contents of a belief are its only contents has been used in a suppressed premise of important
arguments, which I will call “indexical gap arguments”. I have chiefly in mind the knowl-
edge argument [3], various arguments about time that go back to McTaggart’s distinction
between the A-series and B-series [4], and an argument by Tom Nagel in his article “The
Objective Self” [5]. I will illustrate the way the fallacy can work, however, with a less
mysterious case, and leave the application to these more profound arguments and issues to
other occasions.
Consider Gary. He is in a windowless hut across from Little America, just off Interstate
80 in western Wyoming. (Little America is a gas station with a restaurant and souvenir
shop. It has more gas pumps than anyplace in the world.) He has memorized an Interstate
Road Map. Larry knows all the facts about the locations of things along Interstate 80—the
order of states, cities, towns and villages as one progresses east to west or west to east along
Interstate 80, from Berkeley through Reno, Salt Lake City, Little America, Cheyenne, Lin-
coln, and so on. But he isn’t allowed to look out of his hut so he doesn’t know where he
is. Eventually he escapes. He sees all the gas pumps, realizes he is in Little America, and
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immediately knows a number of facts that seem to be facts about where things are along
Interstate 80, but which he didn’t know before. He already knew:
(5)Salt Lake City is southwest of Little America.
Now he learns,
(6)This place is Little America,
and infers
(7)Salt Lake city is southwest of this place.
And so on for many other things. What is the difference between (5) and (7)? Was some-
thing left out of Gary’s Interstate Road Map? It seems that Gary knew all of the facts
provided by the map, but there is something he didn’t know, the fact that he learned and
reported with (7). So there are geographical facts that cannot be captured by complexes of
symbols on maps.
We might try to resolve this dilemma by adding Gary’s hut (or even Gary himself) to
the map. But this wouldn’t solve the problem, for there is a difference between the fact we
would add to the map, and that which Gary learns when he realizes where he is; that is
there is a gap between, say,
Salt Lake City is southwest of the place occupied by hut h
or,
Salt Lake City is southwest of the place occupied by person G,
and
Salt Lake City is southwest of the place occupied by this hut
or,
Salt Lake City is southwest of the place occupied by me.
And the gap would remain even if the map found a place for Gary’s notions and ideas and
beliefs and perceptions, as the reader can verify by following the above pattern.
The item that is left out is expressed with an indexical, and the indexical seems essential
to expressing the change in belief (which is not to say that it is essential to having the
belief). The kind of argument I have in mind takes off from this new item of knowledge,
and gap between it and the original knowledge, so I call argument of this kind, “indexical
gap arguments”. At the heart of these arguments will be, perhaps quite implicit, some
variation on this basic pattern:
– Episodes of knowledge are individuated by the fact known.
– Recognition involves a new episode of knowledge.
– So, recognition involves knowledge of a new fact.
– The inventory of facts available to the knower at the beginning of the episode does not
include the fact known at the end of the episode. (Nothing the map offers Gary tells
him that Salt Lake City is southwest of this place.)
– Therefore the inventory of facts was incomplete.
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On my analysis, Gary’s situation is as follows. The subject matter content of his map-
based beliefs, even before recognition occurred and he learned where he was, required that
the place across the highway from him (which was, in fact, Little America) be northeast
of Salt Lake City. He had two different notions, one map-based, one a buffer for a current
perception, of the same place, Little America. Given these connections between his two
notions and the same place, Little America, for his beliefs to be true Little America has to
have all of the properties associated with either. The link that allows information to flow
between the two, that motivates Gary’s hike across the street and his inference that Salt
Lake City is to the west, seems to have no effect whatsoever on this content.
To see its effect, we need to abstract from one or more of the connections. To see the
effect of the link, let’s shift to a case where the link is a mistake and leads from true beliefs
to false ones. Consider the example above, where I thought I was seeing Paul Newman,
although in fact I was seeing David Israel. Before I made the mistake, the link between
my perceptual buffer and my Paul Newman notion, I had some true beliefs: Paul Newman
is named Paul Newman; he makes good movies, and good Popcorn, etc. The man I am
looking at is across the street; he can hear what I say if I shout at him, etc. When I make
the link I acquire, for the first time, the false belief that Paul Newman is across the street.
The key belief, that leads to this inference, is the one I would express with “That man is
Paul Newman”. This belief has the necessarily false referential content that David Israel is
Paul Newman. This content isn’t helpful in explaining anything. But the reflexive contents
of this belief, which we get by abstracting from one or the other connections, relates the
new belief to both the perceptions that gave rise to it and the somewhat surprising (to Israel)
to actions to which it led.
In Gary’s case, the referential content of his recognitional insight, “that place is Little
America”, is simply the necessary truth the Little America is Little America. The reflexive
contents of this belief, however, relate the new belief to the perceptions that gave rise to
it and the actions that flow from it. Gary comes to have a belief that is only true if his
present perception is of Little America, and this leads to actions that are reasonable if
Little America lies in front of him.
In the indexical gap arguments, the subject matter fallacy occurs in the first step. One
cannot classify beliefs simply by “facts known”. The fact known is basically (the exact
details depending on one’s theory of facts and propositions) the subject matter content of
the true belief in question. But episodes of knowledge that agree on the fact known, may
differ in their reflexive contents. In Gary’s case, the second belief has the reflexive content
that Salt Lake City is southwest of the hut he is then perceiving. The original belief did
not have this reflexive content. The change in reflexive contents explains the changes that
come with the new belief. Gary knows how to get to a place that he sees in front of him
(walk), and so he learns how to get to Little America.
The original map no doubt did not contain the facts that are involved in the reflexive
content of Gary’s new knowledge. But the iterations of the argument for the map’s essential
incompleteness fail. Once we have added the hut, Gary, and his perceptions to the map,
we have represented all the facts corresponding to all of the relevant contents of both
his original and his new belief. Only if we try to make the facts we add to the map the
subject matter contents of his new belief, rather than the reflexive contents of it, will we
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feel there are facts involved in his knowledge that the map’s inventory of facts is essentially
incomplete.
8. Final Dretsetical thoughts
I will end by returning to the Dretske case. When I identified or recognized Dretske. I did
a acquire a new belief. This was a belief that involved my perceptual buffer coming to be
associated with the idea of writing Knowledge and the Flow of Information. This new belief
did not bring any new referential content with it, for its referential content was the same as
my original belief, viz., that Dretske wrote Knowledge and the Flow of Information. But
its total truth conditions are different than the belief I had before. It has different reflexive
content. It is true only if the person my current perception is of, wrote Knowledge and the
Flow of Information. It is the reflexive content of this belief that closes the gap between
my desires and my action of extending my hand to Dretske. If my present perception is of
the author of Knowledge and the Flow of Information, then the hand-shaking directed by
my present perception will be a way of shaking hands with the author of Knowledge and
the Flow of Information.
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